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Abstract
For the selection of a firm’s structure between vertical integration
and arm’s-length outsourcing, the importance of the thickness of the
market had been emphasized in the previous literature. Here we take
account of communication networks such as telephone, telex, fax, and
the Internet. By doing so, we could illustrate the relationship between
communication networks and the make-or-buy decision. With com-
munication network technology differing in each type of firm, both
vertically integrated firms and arm’s-length outsourcing firms coexist,
which was never indicated in the previous literature. However, when
common network technology is introduced, such coexistence generi-
cally does not occur.
Keywords: buyer-supplier relationship, communication networks,
international outsourcing, vertical integration
JEL Classification Numbers: D23, D43, F23
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1 Introduction
Since Coase (1937) raised the boundary-of-the-firm problem, the “make-or-
buy” decision has been a central issue for industrial organization. So far,
a large number of theoretical and empirical studies has been conducted.1
However, as Grossman and Helpman (2002, p. 86) point out, economists who
had studied the make-or-buy decision focused on the bilateral relationship
between a single producer and a potential supplier and they treated the
industry environment as given.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) have first offered a framework for examin-
ing an industrial structure in which integration and outsourcing are treated
as equilibrium phenomena. Using a monopolistic competition model a la
Dixit-Stiglitz, they construct a model which illustrates the selection of the
firm structure between vertical integration and outsourcing2. They empha-
size the trade-off between the costs of running a larger and less specialized
organization and the costs that arise from search frictions and imperfect con-
tracting. Their results are as follows: If the search technology has constant
returns to scale3 “(G)enerically, no industry has both vertically integrated
and specialized producers” (Proposition 1 in Grossman and Helpman (2002,
p. 98)). If the search technology has increasing returns to scale, there exists
an equilibrium where both vertically integrated firms and pairs of upstream
1For theoretical studies, see Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and
Hart (1995). For empirical studies, see Campa and Goldberg (1997), Feenstra (1998) and
Feenstra and Hanson (2005).
2Following this paper, many articles concerning international outsourcing have been
published, for example, those by Grossman and Helpman (2003, 2005), Antras(2003),
Antras and Helpman (2004).
3This ”constant returns to scale” implies that, if the number of both upstream (spe-
cialized) suppliers and downstream (specialized) producers is doubled, the possibility of
matching for both firms is doubled.
3
and downstream firms coexist. However, such equilibrium is never stable.4
Besides the search technology, in the present paper we emphasize that
some more important factors such as transport and communications net-
works affect the selection of the firm structure between vertical integration
and outsourcing. Cairncross (1997, p. 20) points out that costs for commu-
nication networks sharply decreased in the late twentieth century while the
falling trend of transport costs became moderate in the middle of the twen-
tieth century. As such a sharp decline of costs for communication networks
has been observed recently, we focus on the technology for communication
networks study.
Let us examine two opinions concerning the relationship between the
make-or-buy decision and technology of communication networks, presented
by Caves (1996) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001). Caves (1996, p. 61)
mentions that “(T)he historical case studies (also) show that the evolution of
the decentralized multiplant and multinational firm depended on nineteenth-
century innovations in communications (telegraph and telephone services)
that allowed the firm to achieve economies of integration.” On the contrary,
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) point out and anticipate that, as services of
communication networks (e.g., the Internet) become more widespread, the
necessity for containing various production processes under the umbrella of
a huge conglomerate is reduced. Briefly, combining Caves’ and Jones and
Kierzkowski’s stories, we can conceive that the development of technology
related to communication networks may first integrate production processes
and then disintegrate them. Moreover, in the past there were only, for ex-
4Grossman and Helpman (2002, p. 98) mention that since in the case of search tech-
nology, decreasing returns to scale are not supported in the empirical literature, they do
not discuss this issue in their paper.
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ample, only communication by “carrier pigeon” existed and there were no
large conglomerates. In the future, an “ubiquitous” network society with an
advanced communication network technology more sophisticated than the
current Internet system is likely to prevail and we are very much interested
in what will happen to the vertical structure of industry. (The history of
development of communication networks in Japan is presented in Figure 1
as an example.)
Figure 1: History of development of communication networks in Japan
The purpose of the present paper is to show that, by introducing the the-
oretical treatment of communication networks developed by Harris (1995),
a stable equilibrium can be obtained where both vertically integrated firms
and pairs of upstream and downstream firms coexist without increasing re-
turns to matching, which was never indicated in Grossman and Helpman
(2002). Since the breakthrough achieved by Harris (1995), communication
networks in a monopolistically competitive industry have been studied by
Harris (2001), Kikuchi (2002) and Kikuchi and Ichikawa (2002). Harris
(1995) points out that one of the major limitations on coordination of pro-
duction networks is communication technology. Therefore, the make-or-buy
decision within conglomerates and vertically integrated multinational enter-
prises (MNEs) should be affected by communication technology. He empha-
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sizes three characteristics of communication technology; a fixed cost nature
(Once the technology is developed, marginal costs of transmission of infor-
mation are very low), natural monopoly (Fixed costs are so large that the
provider of communication services tends to be a natural monopolist), and
network externalities (The more users, the less or more costs inccured by the
provider). In order to analyze the effects of communication networks on the
make-or-buy decision, we apply a Harris-Kikuchi-Ichikawa type cost function
of communication networks.
The main results are as follows: If both vertically integrated firms such as
MNEs and pairs of upstream and downstream firms utilize different types of
technology for communication networks each (e.g., vertically integrated firms
use telex which the outsourcing pairs cannot use because they cannot afford
to subscribe to telex), stable equilibrium where both vertically integrated and
specialized producers coexist can be attained depending on the relative ex-
tend of network costs inccurred between vertically integrated firms and pairs
of upstream and downstream firms. (The results appear to be much more
evident if vertically integrated firms incur constant network costs and pairs
of upstream and downstream firms use variable network costs. We introduce
this formulation in our model in Section 3.) If both vertically integrated firms
and pairs of upstream and downstream firms utilize a common technology
for communication networks such as the Internet, stable coexistence does not
generically occur. This result is similar to Proposition 1 in Grossman and
Helpman (2002).
It is important to compare these two results. In the case of different net-
work technologies, the difference between these technologies per se results in
stable coexistence. If the number of firms is small enough, variable network
6
costs tend to decrease due to the increasing-returns-to-scale characteristic,
and the firms that incur constant network costs cannot enter the market.
If the scale effect ends, the ”congestion” effect begins to occur and, if the
variable network costs exceed the constant network costs, the firms incur-
ring the constant network costs start to enter the market. In the case of the
common network technology, the network technology itself does not result
in stable existence. The important issue is the difference between the two
types of firms (i.e., the difference in the effect from the search technology, the
costs incurred for using network technologies, the bargaining power between
upstream suppliers and downstream producers, etc.) because both types
of firms can use the same network technology and there is no difference in
network technology. That is, as communication networks become a common
form of technology such as the Internet, network technology is not important
for the make-or-buy decision, even though the probability of coexistence is
very rare as in the case of Proposition 1 in Grossman and Helpman (2002).
In summary, in the past all the firms (or, simple manufacturers) use underde-
veloped common technology such as carrier pigeon and they could not form
large conglomerates. In the nineteenth century, along with the progress of
communication network technology hitherto available to MNEs due to its
costs, (presumably) a vertically integrated structure started to predominate.
Presently, since the costs of the network technology available to outsourcing
pairs have decreased, two types of firm structures are coexisting. In the far
distant future, we may witness the development of an ubiquitous network
society with highly advanced and commonly used communication network
technology, and the two types of firm structures may not coexist.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
7
describe the basic design of the model. In Section 3, we analyze the industry
equilibrium with different types of network technologies. In Section 4, we
analyze the equilibrium with common network technology. In Section 5, we
discuss the characteristics of the factors responsible for stable coexistence in
both cases. We make some concluding remarks in the final section.
2 The Model
We build a Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition model. Our setting
heavily depends on Grossman and Helpman (2002). The economy has J
industries. The representative consumer maximizes a utility function of the
form,
u =
J∑
j=1
µj log
[∫ hj
0
yj(i)
αjdi
]1/αj
,
where yj(i) is the consumption of variety i in industry j and hj is the number
of differentiated varieties. We assume that
∑
j µj = 1, so that the parameter
µj gives the share of spending. We select labor, which is an only primary
factor of production, as the numeraire. The parameter αj ∈ (0, 1) measures
the degree of product differentiation. σj = 1/(1 − αj) > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution as well as the price elasticity of demand. These preferences
yield demand functions,
yDj (i) = Ajpj(i)
−σj ,
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where pj(i) is the price of good i in industry j, and
Aj =
µjL∫ hj
0 pj(l)
1−σjdl
,
and L is aggregate spending, as labor is selected as the numeraire. All the
firms treat Aj (the industry demand level of j) as a constant. Aj can be
rewritten as PI
σj−1
j µjL, where PIj is the price index of yj .
Final goods (y(i)) may be produced by vertically integrated firms or by
downstream producers that purchase their inputs at arm’s-length from up-
stream suppliers. An upstream supplier can produce an input (x(i)) with
one unit of labor per unit of output. We assume that y(i) = x(i), i.e., one
unit of production of y(i) needs one unit of production of x(i). A vertically
integrated firm in industry j requires λj ≥ 1 units of labor to produce a unit
of the input. Let us denote nj as the number of pairs of upstream and down-
stream firms in industry j and vj as the number of vertically integrated firms
in industry j. Analogously, the total number of producers of final goods in
industry j is hj = nj + vj. For simplicity, we analyze symmetric equilibrium
and we omit the index j from the industry-specific variables hereafter.
Firms in pairs play a game with the following five stages: (1) entry; (2)
search with a probability η ≡ n(1, r) 5 for downstream producers and with a
probability η(r)/r ≡ n(s,m)/m for upstream suppliers, where min[s, m] ≥
n(s,m) pairings are formed and s denotes the number of downstream pro-
ducers, m the number of upstream suppliers, and r = m/s (As n(s,m) is
5n(•) itself expresses the number of outsourcing pairs. However, due to the
homogeneous-of-degree-one characteristic, n(•) can be expressed as the matching prob-
ability of outsourcing pairs by taking account of r ≡ m/s, where n(•) forms an abstract
number.
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homogeneous of degree one, n(s,m)/s = n(s/s,m/s) = n(1, r), which shows
the probability that downstream producers can find upstream partners. The
same kind of discussion can be applied to a probability of upstream suppliers
finding partners.); (3) production of intermediate inputs; (4) bargaining for
capturing the joint surplus (p(i)x(i)) with a fraction ω for an upstream sup-
plier and with a fraction (1−ω) for a downstream producer where ω ∈ (0, 1)
; and (5) production and sale of final goods where both an upstream supplier
and a downstream producer maximize the joint surplus. As for the vertically
integrated firms, they play a game with the following two stages: (1) entry;
(2) production and sale of final goods.
An upstream supplier maximizes a potential reward ωp(i)x(i). By max-
imizing it, we obtain the resulting sales of a pair, yo(i) = xo(i) = Apo
−σ,
and the price, po(i) = 1/αω. Analogously, we obtain the resulting sales of a
vertically integrated firm, yv(i) = Ap
−σ
v , and the price, pv(i) = λ/α.
Let N(H) denote the U-shaped cost function for economy-wide com-
munication networks (N(H) > 0, limH→0 N ′(H) = −∞, limH→∞N ′(H) =
∞, N ′′ > 0), where H ≡ J(n + v) denotes the total number of users of
communication network services. We assume that all the firms use network
services if available and that, when vertically integrated firms use network
services, their costs are denoted by gN(H), where g > 0 is a parameter which
shows the difference in the availability of network technology to vertically in-
tegrated firms. (If g ∈ (0, 1), the network costs for vertically integrated firms
are lower than those for outsourcing pairs. If g > 1, the opposite is observed.
If g = 1, the costs are similar for each.)
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3 Use of Different Types of Technologies for
Communication Networks
In this section we assume that each type of firms uses a different type of
technology for communication networks. For example, vertically integrated
firms (e.g., MNEs) use telex or a specialized extension telephone system,
whereas pairs of upstream and downstream firms use a regular telephone
service system, as they cannot afford expensive systems. For simplicity, we
assume that pv < po and that vertically integrated firms use the technology
with constant returns to scale (k, a parameter) and pairs of upstream and
downstream firms use N(H).6 Obviously, H ≡ Jn in this section.
Taking account of n = sη(r), we obtain the industry demand level,
A =
µL
vp1−σv + np1−σo
= PIσ−1µL.
In equilibrium, taking account of po = 1/αω and pv = λ/α, each firm’s
profit function must satisfy zero profit,
πs = η(r)(1 − ω)poyo −N(H)
= η(r)(1 − ω)A(αω)α/(1−α) −N(H) = 0,
πm = (η(r)/r)xo(ωpo − 1)−N(H)
6The results are qualitatively the same even if we assume that both types of firms can
use the U-shaped network technology (i.e., M(Jn) and N(Jv)).
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= (1− α)(η(r)/r)ωA(αω)α/(1−α) −N(H) = 0,
πv = yv(pv − λ)− k
= (1− α)A(α/λ)α/(1−α) − k = 0.
Using πs = 0 and πm = 0, we obtain ro = ω(1−α)/(1−ω). Furthermore,
rearranging πs = 0 and πm = 0 in taking account of ro, we have the following
industry demand level for outsourcing pairs is as follows:
Ao = po
σ(σ − 1) ro
η(ro)
N(H),
and the industry demand level for vertically integrated firms is as follows:
Av = pv
σ(σ − 1)k
λ
.
Ao is required for the viability of outsourcing pairs and Av is required for
the viability of vertically integrated firms.
Taking account of A, Ao and Av, the dynamics of the entry/exit processes
of upstream firms and vertically integrated firms is described below:
n˙ = A− Ao = µL
vp1−σv + np1−σo
− poσ(σ − 1) ro
η(ro)
N(H), (1)
v˙ = A− Av = µL
vp1−σv + np1−σo
− pvσ(σ − 1)k
λ
. (2)
12
At the intersections of n˙ = 0 and v˙ = 0, we obtain the combinations of
numbers of outsourcing pairs and vertically integrated firms that are consis-
tent with zero expected profits for each firm, when upstream suppliers and
downstream producers enter the market in the ratio ro.
In order to obtain stability conditions for the above nonlinear system, let
us linearize it around an equilibrium point (if it exists). Then we have,
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n˙
v˙
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ −
µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1) − po
σro(σ−1)JN ′
η(ro)
− µLp1−σv
PI−2(σ−1)
− µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1) − µLp
1−σ
v
PI−2(σ−1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n− n
∗
v − v∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ . (3)
For simplicity, we define the above as follows:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n˙
v˙
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ B
d
11 B
d
12
Bd21 B
d
22
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n− n
∗
v − v∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
where
Bd11 = −
µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1)
− po
σro(σ − 1)JN ′
η(ro)
,
Bd12 = −
µLp1−σv
PI−2(σ−1)
,
Bd21 = −
µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1)
,
Bd22 = −
µLp1−σv
PI−2(σ−1)
.
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(n∗, v∗) denotes the equilibrium point and superscript d denotes “different
types”. The determinant (DET ) and the trace (tr) of the system are,
DET = Bd11B
d
22 − Bd12Bd21
=
ro
η(ro)
(σ − 1)pσop1−σv PI2(σ−1)JN ′,
tr = Bd11 + B
d
22
= −
[
p1−σo PI
2(σ−1)µL +
ro
η(ro)
pσo (σ − 1)JN ′ + p1−σv PI2(σ−1)µL
]
.
DET > (<)0 if N ′ > (<)0. The sign of tr is negative if N ′ > 0 and is
ambiguous if otherwise. There is no unique solution to the linear system (3)
if N ′ = 0 and we eliminate this case. Taking account of the signs of DET
and tr, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If each type of firms uses different types of technologies for
communication networks (one is constant and the other is the U-shaped) and
if U-shaped network technology has decreasing returns to scale (N ′ > 0), there
is a stable equilibrium where vertically integrated firms and pairs of upstream
and downstream firms coexist.
This is a new result not obtained in Grossman and Helpman (2002).
Technology for communication networks results in stable coexistence of both
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types of firms if they use different types of network technologies. Moreover,
the coexistence is stable, which is never indicated in Grossman and Helpman
(2002).
100 200 300 400 500
n
100
200
300
400
500
v
Figure 2: Use of different technologies
Various types of results can be obtained with combinations of the signs
of DET and tr. Taking account of (1), (2) and (3), we can draw Figure
2 on the n − v plane7. The solid straight line shows that v˙ = 0 and it
shifts upward if the k value is relatively lower than the N(n) value, which
is represented by a dashed line in Figure 2. It shifts downward if otherwise,
as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 2. The solid curved line shows
n˙ = 0. Clearly, Figure 2 depicts the development process of technology for
7To draw Figure 2, we assume the followings: ω = 0.5, α = 0.8, L = 300000, µ = 1,
η = 0.19, λ = 1.9, 150 for a low k value, 250 for a midium k, 700 for a k value. We further
assume that J = 1. Following Harris (2001) and Kikuchi and Ichikawa (2002), we specify
the network cost function as N(n) = n + F/n, where F = 1000.
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communication networks from the 19th century through the 20th century.
(Note that the era of far advanced network technology such as the ubiquitous
network has not yet occurred. We discuss this aspect in the next section.)
If the k value is relatively lower than the N(n) value (i.e., if the network
technology which is only available to vertically integrated firms (e.g., telex)
is much more efficient than that for pairs of upstream and downstream firms),
v˙ = 0 is the dashed line and (n, v) = (0, v∗) is the only stable pair (v∗ > 0).
If the technology which is available to pairs of upstream and downstream
firms advances (e.g., lowering of costs of international phone call), both types
of firms coexist (both solid lines). If the technology becomes much more
advanced (fax machines), v˙ = 0 is the dotted line and (n, v) = (n∗, 0) or
(n, v) = (0, v∗) are stable pairs (n∗ > 0, v∗ > 0) and the industrial structure
never allows stable coexistence. Moreover, in Grossman and Helpman (2002,
p. 91), it is assumed that fixed costs (i.e., constant network costs in the
present paper) for vertically integrated firms must exceed the sum of the costs
incurred by pairs of upstream and downstream firms. In our results, however,
such a condition is not necessary for the industry equilibrium. (Dynamics of
the stable coexistence case is shown in Figure 3.)
In the previous literature, emphasis was placed on the importance of the
“thickness of the market (availability of partners or high possibility of finding
partners)” (McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002)). Their studies
show that complete specialization of the industrial structure (no coexistence
of vertically integrated firms and pairs of upstream and downstream firms)
or coexistence is unstable, as a result. Actually, however, both types of firms
appear to coexist. In addition to the previous literature in which emphasis
was placed on the importance of the thickness of the market, we emphasize
16
Figure 3: Dynamics of stable coexistence
the importance of communication networks for the make-or-buy decision.
This aspect had been discussed over a long period of time (e.g., Caves (1996)
and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001)) but, as far as the author knows, not
formally modeled before.
4 Use of Common Technology for Communi-
cation Networks
In this section, we introduce the common technology for communication net-
works which is available to both vertically integrated firms and pairs of up-
stream and downstream firms (i.e., H ≡ J(n + v)). We can easily conceive
that the technology which we assume is represented by the Internet, or the
ubiquitous network technology in the far distant future. Following the last
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section, the dynamics of the entry/exit processes of vertically integrated firms
and pairs of upstream and downstream firms is described as indicated below:
n˙ = A− Ao = µL
vp1−σv + np1−σo
− pσo
ro
η(ro)
(σ − 1)N(H), (4)
v˙ = A− Av = µL
vp1−σv + np1−σo
− pσv
g
λ
(σ − 1)N(H). (5)
Let us linearize the above nonlinear system around an equilibrium point
(if it exists). Then we obtain,
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n˙
v˙
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ −
µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1) − p
σ
oro(σ−1)JN ′
η(ro)
− µLp1−σv
PI−2(σ−1) − p
σ
o ro(σ−1)JN ′
η(ro)
− µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1) − p
σ
v (σ−1)JgN ′
λ
− µLp1−σv
PI−2(σ−1) − p
σ
v (σ−1)JgN ′
λ
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n− n
∗
v − v∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
(6)
For simplicity, we define the above as follows:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n˙
v˙
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ B
c
11 B
c
12
Bc21 B
c
22
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣ n− n
∗
v − v∗
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
where
Bc11 = −
µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1)
− p
σ
o ro(σ − 1)JN ′
η(ro)
,
Bc12 = −
µLp1−σv
PI−2(σ−1)
− p
σ
o ro(σ − 1)JN ′
η(ro)
,
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Bc21 = −
µLp1−σo
PI−2(σ−1)
− p
σ
v (σ − 1)JgN ′
λ
,
Bc22 = −
µLp1−σv
PI−2(σ−1)
− p
σ
v (σ − 1)JgN ′
λ
,
and superscript c stands for “common.”
The determinant (DET ) and the trace (tr) of the system are,
DET = Bc11B
c
22 − Bc12Bc21
= JN ′
µLpopv
σ−1
PL−2(σ−1)
ro(σ − 1)
η(ro)
(+)︷ ︸︸ ︷
[pv
1−σ − po1−σ]
[(
po
pv
)σ−1
− η(ro)
ro
ωg
]
,
tr = Bc11 + B
c
22
= −
[
µLpo
1−σ
PI−2(σ−1)
+ pσo
ro
η(ro)
(σ − 1)JN ′ + µLpv
1−σ
PI−2(σ−1)
+ pσv
(σ − 1)
λ
JgN ′
]
.
In the case of the common technology, signs of DET and tr are not easily
determined. We must pay attention to the signs of N ′, the signs of the first
square brackets of DET , and the signs of the second square brackets of DET .
As we assumed that pv < po, the sign of the first square brackets is positive.
Let us check the characteristics of the second square brackets. (One
may consider that it is somehow strange to start with the second brackets.
However, the reader for this approach will be clarified.) One should recall
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that there are two types of firm structures and there are three types of profit
functions for each. For equilibrium, the profit functions must satisfy zero
profit, i.e., πs = 0, πm = 0 and πv = 0. Rearranging πm = 0 and πv = 0
8, we
obtain:
(
po
pv
)σ−1
=
η(ro)
ro
ωg.
Clearly, DET = 0 if zero profit conditions for both types of firms are
satisfied. In summary, we have the following conditions for stability:
(
po
pv
)σ−1
<
η(ro)
ro
ωg if πm ≥ 0 and πv < 0, (7)
(
po
pv
)σ−1
>
η(ro)
ro
ωg if πm < 0 and πv ≥ 0, (8)
(
po
pv
)σ−1
=
η(ro)
ro
ωg if πm = 0 and πv = 0. (9)
We have three types of stable equilibria with the above three conditions.
With condition (7), only the pairs of upstream and downstream firms exist.
One should recall that (η(ro)/ro) is the probability of matching for down-
stream firms, ω is the bargaining power of downstream firms, and g is a
parameter for weighting network costs to vertically integrated firms. To hold
(7), the (η(ro)/ro) or g values must be relatively high, implying the existence
of a positive effect on the revenue of outsourcing pairs. Therefore, only out-
sourcing pairs can exist and vertically integrated firms exit from the market.
The opposite occurs if (8) holds. With (9), both types of firms can coexist.
8We need only these two profit functions for the analysis here.
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However, equilibrium is indeterminate because DET = 0.
Now we present an other proposition:
Proposition 2. Stable equilibrium is obtained (i) where only pairs of up-
stream and downstream firms exist if pairs of upstream and downstream firms
are more competitive than vertically integrated firms, (ii) where only verti-
cally integrated firms exist if vertically integrated firms are more competitive
than pairs of upstream and downstream firms, (iii) where both types of firms
coexist if, and only if, both types of firms satisfy zero profit conditions, even
though this equilibrium is not unique.
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Figure 4: Use of the common technology where condition (8) holds
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the results obtained in this section where only
the vertical integrated firms exist, namely, here we assume that condition (8)
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Figure 5: Dynamics where the condition (8) holds
holds ((po/pv)
σ−1 > (η(ro)/ro))ωg)9. The bold line denotes n˙ = 0, the dotted
line denotes v˙ = 0, and the dashed line denotes N ′(n+ v) = 0. As vertically
integrated firms are more competitive than outsourcing pairs, as shown in
Figure 4, stable equilibrium is obtained on the intercepts of the dotted line
on the v axis. If both the dotted line and the bold line overlap, two types of
firm structures coexist but such equilibrium is indeterminate, as in the case
of Proposition 1 in Grossman and Helpman (2002).
5 Concluding Remarks
In the present paper we examined the relationship between stable industry
equilibrium and technology for communication networks. We obtained two
9To draw Figure 4, we assume that ω = 0.5, α = 0.8, L = 300000, µ = 1, η = 0.19,
λ = 1.9, g = 2.45. We further assume that J = 1 and we specify the network cost function
as N(n + v) = (n + v) + F/(n + v) where F = 13000.
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important results for the make-or-buy decision: One is that two types of
firms can coexist stably with communication networks, even though search
technology is associated with constant returns to scale, which is important
for the results of Grossman and Helpman (2002). The other is that stable
coexistence cannot occur where common network technology is available. In
the previous literature such as Grossman and Helpman (2002) and McLaren
(2000), the researchers had emphasized the importance of the thickness of
the market, which enables upstream and downstream firms to easily find
partners. However, our results revealed the importance of technology for
communication networks for the make-or-buy decision, if firms use different
types of communication network technologies. These results are consistent
with empirical observations of the make-or-buy decision reported by Caves
(1996) and with theoretical anticipations reported by Jones and Kierzkowski
(2001). Furthermore, our results may enable to predict that one type of
firm structure may develop in the far distant future, namely the ubiquitous
network society.
For further extension, we can introduce the concept of the relationship
between market openness (which leads to the “thicker” market) and the
make-or-buy decision. McLaren (2000) mentions that, the more open the
market is, the easier it is for outsourcing firms to find partners, because the
market becomes thicker. Taking account of Kikuchi (2002) and Kikuchi and
Ichikawa (2002), we can extend the present model to an open economy to
observe the international outsourcing pattern.
Actually, we may conceive that outsourcing firms can find partners by
making use of advanced technology for communication networks. For exam-
ple, if many upstream and downstream firms have their own web sites on the
23
Internet, it becomes easier for outsourcing firms to find partners and to col-
lect information. Therefore, we can treat the technology for communication
networks in the present model not only as simple input but also as a tool
to increase the possibility of finding partners (η(r)), namely, communication
networks may directly affect the thickness of the market.
24
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Professors Hiroshi Ohta, Kazuhiro Igawa and Towa
Tachibana of Kobe University, Yoshifumi Okawa of Shiga University, Syoji
Haruna of Okayama University, Tetsuro Ichikawa of Surugadai University,
for their valuable comments.
I am, of course, solely responsible for any remaining errors.
25
References
[1] Antras, Pol (2003), Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118, 1375-1418.
[2] Antras, Pol and Elhanan Helpman (2004), Global Sourcing, Journal of
Political Economy 112, 552-580.
[3] Cairncross, Frances (1997), The Death of Distance, Boston: Harvard
Business School Press.
[4] Caves, Richard E. (1996) Multinational Enterprise and Economic Anal-
ysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[5] Coase, Ronald H. (1937) The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4, 386-405
[6] Campa, Jose and Linda S. Goldberg (1997) The Evolving External Ori-
entation of Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from Four Countries,
NBER working paper No. 5919.
[7] Feenstra, Robert C. (1998) Integration of Trade and Disintegration of
Production in the Global Economy, Journal of Economic Perspective 12,
31-50.
[8] Feenstra, Robert C. and Gordon H. Hanson (2005) Ownership and Con-
trol in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory
of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics 2, 729-761.
[9] Grossman, Sanford J. and Oliver Hart (1986) The Costs and Benefits
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of
Political Economy 94, 691-719.
26
[10] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (2002) Integration versus
Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics
117, 85-120.
[11] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (2003), Outsourcing versus
FDI in Industry Equilibrium, Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation 1, 317-327.
[12] Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman (2005), Outsourcing in a
Global Economy, Review of Economic Studies 72, 135-159.
[13] Harris, Richard G. (1995) Trade and communication costs, Canadian
Journal of Economics 28, S46-S75.
[14] Harris, Richard G. (2001) A Communication-Based Model of Global
Production Fragmentation, in S. W. Arndt and H. Kierzkowski eds.,
Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy, New
York: Oxford University Press, 52-75.
[15] Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1990) Property Rights and the Nature of
the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 98, 1119-1158.
[16] Jones, Ronald W. and Henryk Kierzkowski (2001), A Framework for
Fragmentation, in S. W. Arndt and H. Kierzkowski eds., Fragmentation:
New Production Patterns in the World Economy, New York: Oxford
University Press, 17-34.
[17] Kikuchi, Toru (2002) Country-Specific Communications Networks and
International Trade in a Model of Monopolistic Competition, Japanese
Economic Review 53, 167-176.
27
[18] Kikuchi, Toru and Tetsuro Ichikawa (2002) Congestible Communica-
tions Networks and International Trade, Canadian Journal of Economics
35, 331-340.
[19] McLaren, John (2000) Globalization and Vertical Structure, American
Economic Review 90, 1239-1254.
28
